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Abstract
We ﬁnd that institutional ownership in publicly traded companies is as-
sociated with more innovation (measured as cited-weighted patents), even
after controlling for a possible endogeneity of institutional ownership. To
explore the mechanism through which this link arises, we build a model
that nests managerial laziness with career-concern considerations, where
institutional ownership increases the incentives managers have to innovate
by reducing the career risk of innovative projects. While the lazy man-
ager hypothesis predicts a substitution eﬀect between institutional own-
ership and product market competition, the career-concern one allows for
complementarity. Our ﬁnding that the eﬀect of institutional investors on
innovation increases with product market competition supports the career-
concern model. This model is also supported by our ﬁnding that that CEOs
are less likely to be ﬁr e di nt h ef a c eo fp r o ﬁt downturns when institutional
ownership is higher. JEL No. O31, O32, O33, G20, G32
Keywords: Innovation, institutional ownership, career concerns, R&D,
productivity
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to innovate? Innovating requires taking risk and forgoing current returns in the
hope of future ones. Furthermore, while any type of ﬁnancing is plagued by moral
hazard and adverse selection, the ﬁnancing of innovation is probably the most
aﬀected ones (Arrow, 1972), since the information that needs to be conveyed
is the hardest one to be communicated to outsiders. For this reason it is very
important to study the governance of innovation.
While the ability to diversify risk across a large mass of investors makes pub-
licly traded companies the ideal locus for innovation, managerial agency problems
might undermine the innovation eﬀort of these companies. In publicly traded com-
panies, the pressure for quarterly results may induce a short term focus (Porter,
1989). And the increased risk of managerial turnover (Minton and Kaplan, 2008)
might dissuade risk-averse chief executive oﬃcers from this risky activity. Finally,
innovation requires eﬀort and lazy managers might not exert enough of it. Hence,
it is especially important to study the governance of innovation in publicly traded
companies, which account for a large share of the private investments in R&D.
The most important phenomenon in corporate governance in the last 30 years
is the rise in institutional ownership. While in 1970 institutions owned only 10%
of publicly traded equity, by the end of 2005 they owned more than 60%. Thus, in
this paper we focus on the role of institutional ownership on the innovation activity
of publicly traded companies. Did the rise in institutional ownership increased
short-termism, undermining the innovation eﬀort? Or did it reassure managers,
making them more willing to strike for the fence? To answer these questions we
assemble a rich and original panel dataset of over 800 major US ﬁrms over the
1990s containing time-varying information on patent citations, ownership, R&D
and governance.
We show that there is a robust positive association between the level of insti-
2tutional ownership and innovation. Institutions have a small and positive impact
on R&D, but a larger eﬀect on the productivity of R&D (as measured by future
cite-weighted patents per R&D dollar). This relationship is not due to a selection
mechanism, where institutions choose to own the most innovative companies, be-
cause we show that even an exogenous increase in institutional ownership, as the
addition of a stock to the S&P500, has a positive eﬀect on innovation.
To uncover the source of this relationship we build a model that nests the two
main reasons for this positive eﬀect. The simplest explanation is managerial slack:
managers may prefer to live a quiet life but institutional investors may force them
into innovating. An alternative explanation is based on career concerns. Innova-
tion carries a risk for the CEO: if things go wrong for purely stochastic reasons,
the board will start to think he is a bad manager and may ﬁre him. This generates
a natural aversion to innovation. If incentive contracts cannot fully overcome this,
increased monitoring can improve incentives to innovate by “insulating” the man-
ager against the reputational consequences of bad income realizations. According
to this view, institutional owners, which own a large share of the ﬁrm and hence
have incentives to monitor, will encourage innovation. The lazy manager hypoth-
esis predicts that product market competition and institutional ownership are
substitutes: if competition is high then there is no need for intensive monitoring
as the manager is disciplined by the threat of bankruptcy to work hard. In con-
trast, the career concern model predicts that more intense competition reinforces
the positive eﬀect of institutional investment on managerial incentives.
We ﬁnd that the positive relationship between innovation and institutional
ownership is stronger when product market competition is more intense (or when
CEOs are less “entrenched” due to protection from hostile takeovers), which is
consistent with the career concerns hypothesis and inconsistent with the “lazy
manager” one.
3Another implication of the career concern model is that the decision to ﬁre
the CEO is less aﬀe c t e db yad e c l i n ei np r o ﬁtability than in the presence of large
institutional investors. We ﬁnd that to be the case. While in the absence of a large
institutional investor a decline in proﬁt leads to a high percentage probability of
the CEO being dismissed, this probability drops when institutional investors own
a substantial fraction of the stock.
Finally, we try to uncover which institutions have the biggest impact on innova-
tion by using Bushee (1998) classiﬁcation. We ﬁnd that quasi-indexed institutions
have no eﬀect on innovation, while dedicated and transient institutions (to use
Bushee’s classiﬁcation) have an equally positive eﬀect on innovation.
While there is a large literature on the eﬀect of ﬁnancing constrains on R&D
(for surveys see Bond and Van Reenen (2007) and Hall (2002)), there is very
little on the relation between institutional ownership and innovation. Notable
exceptions are Francis and Smith (1995), who ﬁnd a positive correlation between
ownership concentration (which includes institutions) and R&D expenditures and
Eng and Shackell (2001), who ﬁnd a positive correlation of institutions with R&D.
In a similar vain, Bushee (1998) ﬁnds that cuts in R&D following poor earnings
performance are less likely the greater is the degree of institutional ownership.
Unlike all these papers, we focus on the actual productivity of the innovation
process, rather than on the quantity of input (R&D expenses). In addition, our
use of an instrument allows us to exclude the possibility that this relationship is
due to institutions’ ability to select the most productive ﬁrms. Finally, our model
allows us to probe deeper into the fundamental agency problem that causes this
relationship.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the data, Section 2
the econometric framework, Section 3 the main empirical results on institutional
ownership and innovation. The model is described in Section 4 and its additional
4predictions on competition and managerial exit are tested in Section 5. Section 6
oﬀers some concluding comments.
1. Data
We assemble a panel data of ﬁrm-level data on innovation and institutional own-
ership from a variety of sources. Our starting point is Compustat, which contains
accounting information for all U.S. publicly listed ﬁrms since the mid 1950s. While
Compustat contains information on R&D expenditures, it does not contain patent
data. We get these by using the NBER match between Compustat and the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Oﬃce data. This contains detailed information on almost
three million U.S. patents granted between January 1963 and December 1999 and
all citations made to these patents between 1975 and 2002 (over 16 million)1.
Since the value of these patents diﬀer greatly, to capture their importance we
weight them by citations.
For information on institutional ownership we use the text ﬁles of Compact
Disclosure. Ownership data includes the number of institutional owners, the num-
ber of shares issued and the percent of outstanding shares held by each institu-
tion2. The ownership data covers 91,808 ﬁrm-year observations between 1991 and
2004 (prior to 1991 there are some inconsistencies in the reporting of the own-
ership data which is why this is our ﬁrst year). We then matched these data
with Bushee (1998) classiﬁcation of institutions, to investigate whether there are
1See Bronwyn Hall, Adam Jaﬀe and Manuel Trajtenberg (2001) and Adam Jaﬀea n dM a n u e l
Trajtenberg (2002).We used Bronwyn Hall’s update of the citation ﬁles which runs through to
2002.
2All institutional organizations, companies, universities, etc. are required to ﬁle a Form 13-F
with the SEC on a quarterly basis if they have greater than $100 million in equity assets under
discretionary management. All common stock holdings of 10,000 or more shares or having a
value of $200,000 or more must be reported. Throughout this paper an institutional owner is
deﬁned as an institution that ﬁles a 13-F.
5diﬀerential eﬀects by the type of institutional owner.
Third, for information on CEO ﬁring, exits in general and other managerial
characteristics we use the data constructed by Ray Fisman, Rakesh Khurana and
Matthew Rhodes-Kropf (2005) based on careful reading of the ﬁnancial press and
the S&P ExecuComp database.
Finally, for information on corporate governance and state laws against hostile
takeovers we use the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) which pub-
lishes detailed listings of corporate governance provisions for individual ﬁrms (see
Paul Gompers, Andrew Metrick and Joy Ishii, 2003 and Maria Pinnelle, 2000).
These datasets do not overlap perfectly so our baseline regressions run between
1991, the ﬁrst year of clean ownership data, and 1999, the last year when we
can realistically construct citation weighted patent counts. Although the exact
number of observations depends on speciﬁc regression, the sample for which we
run the cite-weighted patents equation contains 6,208 observations on 803 ﬁrms.
Descriptive statistics are contained in Table 1. We see that our ﬁrms are large
(3,700 employees and $608,000 in sales at the median). As is well-known the
citation and patents series are very skewed. For example, the mean number of
cite-weighted patents is 176 per ﬁrm-year, but the median number of cites is only
two.
1.1. Nonparametric analysis
We ﬁrst take a preliminary, non-parametric look at the data in Figures 2 and 3.
Figure 2 presents the non-parametric relationship between the log of raw patent
counts and the proportion of ﬁrm’s equity owned by institutions. Figure 3 presents
the same graph but using our preferred future citation weighted patents measure.
On both graphs we show a line of the local linear regression estimated by the
lowest smoother with a bandwidth of 0.8. There is clearly a positive correlation
6between the two variables which appears to be broadly monotonic, although the
positive relation does not appear until institutions own at least 25% of the shares.
2. Econometric modeling strategy
2.1. Modeling Innovation
Consider the ﬁrst moment of the relationship between a count-based measure
of innovation (i.e. future/forward cite-weighted patents), CITESit, of ﬁrm i in
period t and our measure of institutional ownership (the proportion of stock owned
by institutions)3. The conditional expectation (E(.|.) ) of innovation is:
E(CITESit|xit)=e x p ( αINSTITit + βxit + ηi + τt) (2.1)
where xit are other control variables4, ηi is a ﬁrm-speciﬁci d i o s y n c r a t i ce ﬀect
and τt is a full set of time dummies. Note that we will show the importance
of diﬀerent conditioning variables. In particular, we consider speciﬁcations with
and without controlling for the R&D stock. When the R&D stock is included in
equation (2.1) α indicates whether ﬁrms with higher INSTITit have a greater
ability to obtain innovations from their R&D stock (“R&D productivity”). When
we drop R&D from the right hand side α will reﬂect both this eﬀect and any
additional eﬀect of institutions in raising investment in R&D.
We adopt the log-link formulation because of the count-based nature of the
data. Diﬀerent assumptions concerning the error term will generate alternative
estimators even though the ﬁrst moment (2.1) is the same. Our baseline is the
Poisson model where the mean equals the variance. Since all models will allow
3See Richard Blundell, Rachel Griﬃth and John Van Reenen (1999) and Jerry Hausman,
Bronwyn Hall and Zvi Griliches (1984) for discussions of count data models of innovation.
4We consider a range of control variables suggested by the existing literature on models of
innovation and models of institutional ownership. For example we condition on size and the
capital-labor ratio (see inter alia Hall et al, 2005, and Gompers and Metrick, 2001).
7the standard errors to have arbitrary heteroscedacity and autocorrelation (i.e.
by clustering the standard errors by ﬁr m )t h ee x a c tf u n c t i o n a lf o r mo ft h ee r r o r
distribution is not so important. The variance of the Negative Binomial under
our speciﬁcation is:
V (CITESit)=e x p ( αINSTITit+βxit+ηi+τt)+ϑexp(2(αINSTITit+βxit+ηi+τt))
where the parameter, ϑ,i sam e a s u r eo f“ o v e r - d i s p e r s i o n ” .
We introduce ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects, ηi, into the count data model using the “mean
scaling” method introduced by Richard Blundell, Rachel Griﬃth and John Van
Reenen (1999). This relaxes the strict exogeneity assumption underlying the
model of Jerry Hausman, Bronwyn Hall and Zvi Griliches (1984) who introduced
the ﬁxed eﬀect Poisson model (analogously to the within-group estimator for lin-
ear panel data models). Essentially, we exploit the fact that we have a long
pre-sample history (of up to 25 years per ﬁrm) on patenting behavior to construct
the pre-sample average of cite-weighted patents. This can then be used as an
initial condition to proxy for unobserved heterogeneity under certain conditions
(in particular, the ﬁrst moments of the variables must be stationary). Although
there will be some ﬁnite sample bias, Monte Carlo evidence shows that this pre-
sample mean scaling estimator performs well compared to alternative econometric
estimators for dynamic panel data models with weakly endogenous variables5.
Following standard procedures we use patents that are ultimately granted
dated by year of application and we weight these by future citations through
to 2002. To deal with the censoring of patents we have done two things. First,
we estimate only until 1999 allowing for a three year window of future citations
for the last cohort of patents in the data. Second, we include a full set of time
5Richard Blundell, Rachel Griﬃth and Frank Windmeijer (2002) discuss this extensively
using the patents-R&D relationship for a much earlier version of the Compustat data.
8dummies which controls for the fact that patents taken out later in the panel have
less time to be cited than patents taken out earlier in the panel6.
A na d v a n t a g eo ft h e s ec o u n td a t am o d e l si st h a tw et a k et h ez e r o se x p l i c i t l y
into account. We compare the results of these models with OLS estimates on the
sample of ﬁrms with non-zero patenting, i.e.
lnCITESit = αINSTITit + βxit + ηi + τt + υit (2.2)
and with models that use the arbitrary re-scaling and substitute the dependent
variable with ln(1 + CITESit).
2.2. Identiﬁcation
Although we lag all variables by one year, the coeﬃcient on institutional own-
ership may be biased for many reasons. The main concern is that institutions
select ﬁrms to invest in on the basis of characteristics that are observable to them
but not to us. For example, institutions might invest in ﬁrms when they antici-
pate a surge in their production of innovation. The second problem is that our
measure of institutional ownership might be noisy. Besides recording and clas-
siﬁcation mistakes, the main concern is that institutions might behave in a very
diﬀerent way. By using the total amount of institutional ownership, rather than
the amount of institutional ownership held by "active" institutions, we are likely
to underestimate their eﬀect.
To address the endogenous selection process we follow Clay (2001) and use the
inclusion of a ﬁrm in the S&P500 has an instrument. An S&P500 ﬁrm is more
likely to be owned by institutions for at least three reasons. First, openly indexed
funds that track the S&P500 will be forced to invest in this company. Second,
6We also experimented with re-normalizing citations taking into account the year in which
the patent was taken out (see Bronwyn Hall et al, 2005). These delivered similar results to the
unadjusted citations results presented here.
9even non-indexed funds are usually benchmarked against the S&P500 so there is
an incentive for them to be over-exposed to companies in the S&P500. Thirdly,
ﬁduciary duty laws - such as ERISA - have been shown to inﬂuence portfolio
selection through their implied endorsement of broad indexing7.
Stocks are added to the S&P because they represent well a certain sector,
not for their expected performance. Standard and Poor’s explicitly states that
" the decision to include a company in the S&P 500 Index is not an opinion on
that company’s investment potential." Hence, the S&P500 inclusion is unrelated
to the fundamental performance of ﬁr m sa n dt h u ss e e m st os a t i s f yt h ee x c l u s i o n
restriction for a valid instrument.
We implement the instrumental variable estimator in two ways. First, we
consider the two-stage least squares results. Although this is relatively uncon-
troversial for continuous variables, it is problematic for the count data models
(which have a mass point at zero). For this reason our preferred results use a
control function approach (see Richard Blundell and James Powell, 2001). Under
exogeneity of INSTITit we have the moment condition:
E(υit|INSTITit,x it,ηi,τt)=1
where υ
p
it is the error term in equation (2.1). This will not hold under en-
dogeneity of INSTITit.We assume that the instrument zit obeys the reduced
form:
INSTITit = πzit + β
ox
o
it + η
o
i + τ
o
t + υ
o
it
with
E(υ
o
it|x
o
it,η
o
i,τ
o
t)=1
7See Diane Del Gurcio (1996), John Wei and Stephen Pruitt (1989) or Kenneth Froot, David
Scharfstein and Jeremy Stein (1992) for supportive evidence.
10so that controlling for υo
it in the conditional moment condition is suﬃcient to
remove the endogeneity bias. In estimation we use the extended moment condition
E(CITESit|Xit,υ
o
it)=e x p ( αINSTITit + βxit + ηi + τt + ρ(υ
o
it)) (2.3)
where ρ(υo
it) is a non-parametric function of υo
it (empirically we used a poly-
nomial series expansion). A simple test for exogeneity is the joint signiﬁcance of
the residuals in equation (2.3).
3. Main empirical ﬁndings
3.1. Innovation and institutional ownership
Table 2 contains the ﬁrst set of results where we measure innovation by patent
counts weighted by the number of citations they receive in the future (“CITES”)8.
Columns (1) and (2) report the OLS estimates, where ln(CITES) is the dependent
variable (so we drop observations with zero cites). Columns (3) through (8) are
proper count data models where we include all the zeros and avoid arbitrary
transformations9. Columns (3) through (5) report the estimates using Poisson
regressions, while columns (6) through (8) report the negative binomial (Negbin)
ones10.
Across all the columns of Table 2 the coeﬃcient on institutional ownership lies
between 0.005 and 0.010. A marginal eﬀect of 0.007 implies that an increase of
8We obtained quite similar results just using raw patent counts so we generally omit present-
ing the results.
9See below in Appendix Table A3 for an alternative where we consider ln(1 + CITES) as an
alternative dependent variable and obtain similar results.
10Note that Negbin is more general than Poisson as we relax the assumption than the variance
is equal to the mean. However, since we allow a general error structure when clustering the
standard errors (i.e. they are robust to arbitrary autocorrelation and heteroscedacity) this is
not so critical (see Blundell, Griﬃth and Van Reenen, 1995, 1999 for a discussion).
11ten percentage points in institutional ownership (e.g. from the mean of 45.5% to
55.5%) is associated with a seven percent increase in the probability of obtaining
an additional cite-weighted patent (i.e. from the mean of 176 cite weighted patents
to 188). This seems a result of economic as well as statistical signiﬁcance. In our
sample period between 1991 and 1999 the average level of institutional ownership
for our ﬁrms rose from 40% to 50%, so ten percentage points is a reasonable change
to consider.
Column (1) of Table 2 simply presents the OLS regressions of ln(CITES) on
institutional ownership with controls for the ln(capital/labor) ratio, ln(sales), four-
digit industry dummies and time dummies. As shown by Figures 2 and 3, there is
a positive and signiﬁcant association between innovation and the ﬁrm’s share of
equity owned by institutions. Column (2) includes the ﬁrm’s R&D stock which, as
expected has a positive and signiﬁcant association with patent citations (see, e.g.
Bronwyn Hall et al, 2005). Conditioning on R&D slightly reduces the coeﬃcient
of institutional ownership (from 0.006 to 0.005) suggesting that the main eﬀect
of ownership is to alter quality and/or productivity of R&D rather than through
simply stimulating more R&D. If we use ln(R&D) as a dependent variable instead
of patents, institutional ownership has a signiﬁcant and positive association with
ﬁrm R&D investment (even after controlling for ﬁxed eﬀects) although the magni-
tude of this eﬀect is small (see Appendix Table A1). Thus, previous studies which
have focused on R&D as the sole measure of innovation have underestimated the
importance of institutions.
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 2 repeat the speciﬁcations of the ﬁrst two columns
but use a Poisson count data model. Since the zeros can now be used the number
of observations increases by about half (from 4,025 to 6,208). The coeﬃcient on
institutional ownership remains signiﬁcant with a larger marginal eﬀect of 0.08
when we condition on R&D. Column (5) includes the controls for ﬁxed eﬀects
12following the method of Blundell et al (1999) using the pre-sample history of ci-
tations to control for correlated unobserved heterogeneity. The ﬁxed eﬀects are
highly signiﬁcant, but only reduce the marginal eﬀect of institutions to 0.007 and
the coeﬃcient remains signiﬁcant. The ﬁnal three columns repeat the Poisson
speciﬁcations but use the more general Negative Binomial model (which relaxes
the assumption of the equality between the variance and the mean). The qualita-
tive results are very similar: institutional ownership has a positive and signiﬁcant
marginal eﬀect. Note that using the Hausman et al (1984) approach to controlling
for ﬁxed eﬀects in count data models leads to similar results for the coeﬃcient on
institutional ownership. In an identical speciﬁcation to column (8) the coeﬃcient
is 0.005 with a standard error of 0.002.
3.2. Controlling for endogeneity
As discussed above, we use a ﬁrm’s membership to the S&P500 index as an in-
strument for institutional ownership to address the possible endogeneity of this
variable. Table 3 reports the results. The ﬁrst column reproduces the basic Pois-
son results of Table 2 column (3) for reference. Column (2) presents the ﬁrst stage
where we regress institutional ownership on a dummy equal to unity if the ﬁrm
was in the S&P500 (and all the other controls). As expected the instrument is
positive and highly signiﬁcant. Institutions own 9.2 percentage points more of the
equity in ﬁrms that are included in the S&P500 Index than we would expect from
the observable characteristics of these ﬁrms.
The third column presents the estimates where we use the control function
method outlined in the econometric section11. Interestingly, the ownership vari-
able remains signiﬁcant with a coeﬃcient that is much larger than column (1). At
11This uses just a ﬁrst order term in the polynomial for the control function. The second
order term was insigniﬁcant (p-value =0.274). The coeﬃcient on institutional ownership was
0.035 (standard error = 0.015) when both terms of the control function were included.
13face value, this result suggests that we are underestimating the positive eﬀect of
ownership on innovation by treating institutions as exogenous.
The next three columns of Table 3 repeats the speciﬁcations but include ﬁxed
eﬀects. Column (4) shows the standard result treating institutional ownership as
exogenous and column (5) has the ﬁrst stage. The external instrument remains
highly signiﬁcant. In column (6) we use the control function approach to deal with
the endogeneity of institutional ownership and again, the coeﬃcient on ownership
remains positive and signiﬁcant with a much higher marginal eﬀect than column
(4). This is consistent with some attenuation bias towards zero in the OLS results.
Note, however, that exogeneity is not rejected at the 5% level in column (6)
whereas it is rejected at the 1% level in column (3). This suggests that the ﬁxed
eﬀects deal with a substantial part of the endogeneity bias, and to the extent it
is a problem (exogeneity is still rejected at the 10% level in the ﬁnal column) the
bias causes us to underestimate the importance of institutions.
While the inclusion to the S&P500 should be orthogonal to a ﬁrm’s future
performance, it is not completely random. Standard & Poor’s wants to insure
that the index is representative and that it is relatively stable over time. Hence,
it avoids choosing companies that are at serious risk of bankruptcy and prefers
large companies with a good past performance. In order to be included in the
S&P500 index, thus, a company must have been small in the past (which explains
why it was not already in the index) and large today. Given these rules, it is not
surprising that companies that are added on average experience very large stock
returns in the three years preceding their inclusion. As a result, the apparent
eﬀect of S&P500 addition on innovation could be spurious, due to the fact that
stock performance anticipates the rise in innovation. Note that this is a very
tough test, as innovation is positively associated with stock prices (see Hall et al,
2005 for direct evidence) thus making it hard to identify an independent eﬀect of
14institutional ownership on innovation.
To rule out this possibility, in the ﬁnal column of Table 3 we control for the
cumulative stock returns over the previous three years as an additional variable.
Consistent with a correlation between run up and innovation, we ﬁnd that the run
up has a positive and statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on innovation. Yet, the
coeﬃcient of institutional ownership falls only slightly: from 0.029 to 0.023 and
remains statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Thus, the result does not appear
to be driven by simultaneous "good news" about the ﬁrm.12
Another concern with our IV strategy is that the treatment ﬁrms (which joined
the S&P500) are not well matched with the rest of the sample (the implicit control
group). To examine this we use a propensity score matching technique. We
estimate the propensity to join the S&P500 as a function of the exogenous ﬁrm
characteristics (including ﬁxed eﬀects). Very few ﬁrms that are members of the
S&P500 have a predicted probability below 0.24 (roughly the sample median).
Hence, we trim the sample below this threshold so that treatment and control
have common support and re-estimate the IV results on this sub-sample. The
results (not reported) are very similar: we estimate a treatment eﬀect of 0.026
(standard error = 0.013) on this sub-sample of 3,099 observations compared to
0.029 (standard error = 0.013) on the full sample of 6,028.
Finally, to further validate the quality of the instrument we perform a small
event studies on the cite-weighted patents around the time a stock is added to the
S&P500 index. We use a window of 7 years, three years prior to the year when
the ﬁrm was added, the year itself and three years after the ﬁrm was added (a
similar story emerges from adding or subtracting an extra year to the window).
As Figure 4 shows cite-weighted patents increase in the two years following
12In an unreported regression we controlled for Tobin’s Q instead of cumulative returns. The
coeﬃcient on institutional ownership remains very similar (0.027) and retains its statistically
signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
15the addition to the S&P500 index. Three years after the addition, the number of
cite-weighted patents increased by almost 3, a 43% increase with respect to the
median.
3.3. Simply an eﬀect of ownership concentration?
To what extent the eﬀect found is driven by an omitted variable: ownership con-
centration. To address this problem directly in unreported regressions we included
various measures of ownership concentration in our baseline speciﬁcation. For ex-
ample, we constructed a variable measuring the proportion of equity held by the
top ﬁve shareholders. This ownership concentration measure enters positively and
(weakly) signiﬁcantly into an innovation speciﬁcation that does not include any
measure of institutional ownership, but its eﬀect is driven to zero when we insert
also the institutional ownership variable. For example, in Table 2, column (5) the
coeﬃcient (standard error) on the concentration measure was 0.004 (0.003) and
the institutional ownership variable remained positive and signiﬁcant (coeﬃcient
of 0.007 with a standard error of 0.002). If we drop institutional ownership from
the regression, however, the coeﬃcient (standard error) on ownership concentra-
tion rises to 0.005(0.003), which is signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
This result suggests that our ﬁndings are not driven by the omission of an
ownership concentration variable, but the other way around: the existing ﬁndings
of the positive eﬀects of ownership concentration may be due to the failure to
distinguish between institutional and non-institutional ownership. This is reason-
able. If there are some ﬁxed costs in setting up eﬀective monitoring across ﬁrms,
institutions, which typically hold large blocks in several companies, they can ex-
ploit these economies and monitor more eﬀectively. Second, the market can more
easily infer from the selling behavior of institutions, which have fewer liquidity
reasons to sell, than from the trading of individuals.
16Overall, all these results point in the direction of a positive eﬀect of institu-
tional ownership on innovation. What remains to be explained is why that is the
case. We attack this problem in the next section.
4. The model
4.1. Basic framework
Consider the following variant of Holmstrom (1982)’s career concerns model.
There are two periods, t =1 ,2. The ﬁrm is run by a manager with unknown
ability θ ∈ {θ,θ}. T h ep r i o rb e l i e f sa b o u tθ are that:
Pr(θ = θ)=P r ( θ = θ)=1 /2.
For notational simplicity we normalize θ at zero.
At the beginning of period 1, the manager decides whether or not to innovate.
We denote the innovation decision by i ∈ {0,1}. If the manager does not innovate
(i =0 ), then her project is assumed to be uninformative about her ability in the
sense that the revenue realization in period 1 is uncorrelated with ability. We
n o r m a l i z et h i sr e v e n u ea tz e r o .
If the manager decides to innovate (i =1 ), she must incur an innovation cost
I and then the period 1 revenue realization is equal to:
y1 =
½
1 with probability p
0 with probability 1 − p
if the manager is of high ability (that is with θ = θ), and to
y1 =
½
1 with probability αp
0 with probability 1 − αp ,
where (i) α<1, so that a lower ability manager is less successful at innovating
than a higher ability manager; and (ii) p =1 π, where π is the probability that the
innovation is imitated. The parameter π measures the degree of product market
competition, so where competition I more intense innovation I less likely
174.2. A career concern model
In the main part of the model we will assume, following Holmstrom (1982),that
the manager is concerned about the impact that her decision will have on the
market perception about her ability. Absent an institutional investor, the market
infers the manager’s ability from observing the period 1 revenue realization. Thus,
by innovating, the manager exposes herself to the risk of losing her job. This in
turn limits her incentive to innovate in the ﬁrst place. In the presence of an
institutional investor who monitors (i.e., collect independent information about
the quality of the manager), the market can infer the manager’s type also from
the institutional investor’s action. For simplicity, in the model we assume that
the institutional investor’s action is to decide whether to keep the manager. In
reality, things are more subtle. Unhappy institutional investors do not ﬁre the
manager directly (since generally they have no representative on the board), but
can pressure behind the scene the board to do so. Alternatively, they can exercise
their exit option and sell, causing the stock price to drop and triggering the board
to act. Either way informed institutional investors’ action reveals the manager’s
type to the market independently from period 1 revenue realization.
The timing of moves is as follows: (i) the manager ﬁrst decides whether to
innovate (and pay I); (ii) the institutional investor learns about the manager’s
ability, provided she invests a monitoring cost K; (iii) the ﬁrst period revenue is
realized and based on that realization the market updates its assessment of the
manager’s ability; (iv) the manager decides whether to stay with the ﬁrm, based
on the comparison between her expected wage in period 2 if she remains inside
the ﬁrm versus what she can expects if she reallocates to another sector.
To complete our description of the model we make three assumptions:
Assumption 1: The market for managers is fully competitive, and the second
period wage of a manager is equal to her expected ability conditional upon the
18i n f o r m a t i o na c q u i r e di np e r i o d1 .
This assumption is identical to that made in Holmstrom (1982).
Assumption 2: The institutional investor acquires perfect information about
the manager’s ability only if the manager innovates
In the context of the model this assumption is justiﬁed by the fact that only in-
novation reveals the manager’s ability, since it is only when the manager innovates
that the revenue realization depends upon her ability. Realistically, the implicit
assumption is that the investor can monitor the manager while she undertakes the
innovative strategy and assess her ability independent of the revenue realization.
If not innovative strategy is undertaken, there is no opportunity for the investor to
learn whether the outcome is due to luck or skill.13 After gathering this additional
information, the investor decides whether to have the manager ﬁred.
Assumption 3: Managerial ability is sector-speciﬁc, thus what happens on
her current job is uncorrelated with the manager’s ability if she moves to another
sector.14 Moreover, a manager who reallocates to another sector incurs a switching
cost equal to δ.
Assumption 3 implies that every time a manager is ﬁred and reallocates to
another sector she has a new draw of the distribution of talents, so that her
expected utility equals to:
w =
1
2
θ − δ.
This is also the manager’s reservation wage on her current job.
13As we discuss below, if the investor were able to learn about the manager’s ability regardless
of whether she innovates institutional ownership would have a negative eﬀect on innovation,
which is the opposite of what we observe in the data.
14Below we analyze the polar case where skills are fully non-sector speciﬁc.
194.3. Equilibrium wage and innovation without institutional investor
We ﬁrst consider the benchmark case where no information is acquired by the
institutional investor. We solve the model by backward induction. Suppose that
the manager has decided to innovate. Then, based on the revenue realization in
period 1, the market updates its beliefs about managerial ability using Bayes’
rule. Consequently, the manager’s wage in period 2 if she remains in the ﬁrm, is
given by:
w2(y1)=P r ( θ = θ/y1)θ.
If y1 =1 ,t h e n
Pr(θ = θ/y1 =1 )=
p
p + αp
=
1
1+α
.
We thus get:
w2(y1 =1 )=
θ
1+α
.
Similarly,
w2(y1 =0 )=P r ( θ = θ/y1 =0 ) θ =
1 − p
2 − p − αp
θ.
Assumption 4:
θ
1+α
>
1
2
θ − δ = w >
1 − p
2 − p − αp
θ.
This assumption implies that the manager will leave the ﬁrm whenever her
ﬁr s tp e r i o dr e v e n u ep e r f o r m a n c ei sl o w .N o t et h a tw ea l w a y sh a v e
1
1+α
>
1
2
>
1 − p
2 − p − αp
,
so that there is a non-empty set of parameters (α,w,p) which satisfy Assumption
4.
20Now, moving back to the initial stage of the game, the manager will decide to
innovate if and only if:
U(i =0 )<U(i =1 )− I,
where
U(i =0 )=
1
2
θ
is the ex ante utility conditional upon not innovating (if the company is surpassed
by a rival in innovation, the manager goes back to the labor market and gets her
expected value, minus a relocation cost δ),a n d
U(i =1 )=(
1
2
p +
1
2
αp)
θ
1+α
+[
1
2
(1 − p)+
1
2
(1 − αp)]w. (4.1)
The ﬁrst term in the ﬁrst line of U(i =1 )is the ex ante probability of a high
revenue realization15 times the second period wage conditional upon a high revenue
realization w2(y1 =1 ) . The second term is the ex ante probability of a low revenue
realization times the manager’s expected payoﬀ from moving to another ﬁrm.
Thus
U(i =1 )=
1
2
pθ +
1
2
(2 − p − αp)w.
In particular, note that
U(i =1 )− I>U (i =0 )
whenever I and π are not too large.
4.4. Institutional investment and innovation
We now introduce the institutional investor into the analysis. By learning the true
managerial ability, the institutional investor avoids having to keep a low ability
15That is the ex ante probability of θ = θ (i.e 1
2) times the probability of a high revenue
conditional upon θ = θ (i.e. p) plus the probability of θ = θ (i.e 1
2) times the probability of a
high revenue conditional upon θ = θ (i.e. αp)
21manager. Let Π denote the net expected gain from getting rid of a low ability
manager before the period 1 income realization.16
If the investor owns a fraction ψ of the ﬁrm’s shares17, he will choose to pay
the cost K of learning the manager’s ability whenever
ψΠ >K .
Thus, if the investor’s share of proﬁts ψ is suﬃciently high, he will pay the
learning cost K. In this case, the manager’s expected utility from innovating
becomes18
U(i =1:monitor)=
1
2
θ +
1
2
w.
We can establish:
Proposition 4.1. Monitoring by an institutional investor, which occurs when the
investor’s share of the ﬁrm’s proﬁts is suﬃciently large, increases the manager’s
gain from innovating. This positive eﬀect is increased with higher product market
competition π.
16This gain is computed as follows. First, the wage saving in period 2 from identifying a bad
manager beforehand, is equal to αpw2(y1 =1 ) . The expected gain of getting rid of a low ability
manager and replacing her by a new manager, is thus equal to this expected wage savings plus
the expected gain from ﬁnding a new manager
Π =
1
2
αpw2(y1 =1 )−
1
2
αp +
1
2
.
1
2
(p − θ)
or
Π =
1
2
αp(
θ
1+α
− 1) +
1
4
(p − θ),
which is positive for α suﬃciently small.
17The paper takes a partial equilibrium approach by taking the investor’s share ψ as exoge-
nously given. Endogeneizing ψ would involve introducing new considerations such as risk-pooling
or the enhancement of managerial initiative, into the model.
18When the institutional investor monitors, the manager gets θ i fs h ei sf o u n do u tt ob eo f
high ability and w if she is found out to be of low ability.
22Proof: We have:
∆U = U(i =1:monitor) − U(i =1 )=
1
2
[θ(1 − p) − (1 − p − αp)w].
That θ>wimplies immediately that ∆U is positive. Furthermore,
d
dπ
(∆U)=
1
2
[θ − (w + αw)]
is positive since Assumption 4 has θ
1+α >w . This establishes the proposition.
Corollary 4.2. Innovation takes place for a larger range of innovation costs I
when the manager is monitored by an institutional investor and the more so the
higher competition.
Proof: This results immediately from the fact that innovation takes place
whenever
U(i =1:monitor) − U(i =0 )>I.
Thus, institutional investment stimulates managerial innovation by insulating
the manager against the reputational risk from a bad revenue realization, and
this eﬀect is stronger when the degree of product market competition is higher
(measured by the imitation probability π).
Remark 1: Consider what happens if the institutional investor ﬁnds out
about the manager’s ability irrespective of whether the manager innovated. In
this case we have:
U(i =0:monitor)=
1
2
θ +
1
2
w = U(i =1:monitor).
But then the manager is deterred from innovating altogether, since
U(i =1:monitor) − U(i =0:monitor)=0<I .
23Remark 2: Let us compare the above analysis with what happens if manage-
rial skills are fully transferable (i.e., completely non sector speciﬁc). In this case,
in the absence of an institutional investor the ex ante utility of a manager who
i n n o v a t e si se q u a lt o
U(i =1 )=
1
2
pθ +
1
2
(2 − p − αp)
1 − p
2 − p − αp
θ =
1
2
θ = U(i =0 ) ,
i.e., it is identical to the expected utility of a manager who does not innovate.
Similarly, in the presence of an institutional investor who monitors the ex ante
utility conditional upon innovating is equal to
U(i =1:monitor)=
1
2
θ = U(i =0 ) .
In this case, thus, monitoring by the institutional investor does not aﬀect at
all the manager’s incentives to innovate. The reason is very simple. In a model
where managers are risk neutral, the source of career concern for a manager arises
from the cost she faces in reallocating her talent across sectors (δ). If such a
cost disappears, the career concern disappears as well and so does the eﬀect of
the monitoring undertaken by the institutional investor. To reproduce the eﬀect
in a world with fully general skills, however, it would suﬃce to assume that the
manager is risk averse.
Remark 3: In the model so far, innovation increases the probability of im-
itation. Now consider the following variant where innovation allows the ﬁrm to
escape competition. In this variant, the ﬁrm is imitated with probability 2π in
the absence of innovation, so that
U(i =0 )=( 1− 2π)
1
2
θ +2 πw.
In this case, an increase in competition π increases the net gain (U(i =1 )−U(i =
0) − I) of an innovating manager in the absence of institutional investor. But it
24increases by even more the net gain (U(i =1:monitor) − U(i =0 )− I) of an
innovating manager monitored by an institutional investor. Thus the introduction
of an institutional investor magniﬁes the escape competition eﬀect of innovation,
which in turn reinforces the complementarity between institutional investment
and competition.
4.5. Contrasting with the "lazy manager" story
An alternative explanation to that developed so far, inspired by Hart (1983) and
Schmidt (1997), is that monitoring by institutional investors, together with the
managers’ fear of losing the private beneﬁts of remaining on the job, would force
the latter to innovate if they are a priori reluctant to do so.
To nest this idea into the same model we assume that the manager draws
private beneﬁt B from remaining on the job, but that innovating entails a private
cost K to her. Other than that, the manager does not respond to monetary
incentives, whether explicit or implicit. Finally, we assume that the institutional
investor will monitor with probability m (which is a function of the size of the
stake it owns). When the investor monitors, it can observe whether the manager
has innovated and can decide whether to ﬁre her. As a result, the investor can use
the ﬁring threat to force the manager to innovate. More speciﬁcally, the manager
will choose to innovate whenever:
B − K>B (1 − π)(1 − m).
As before, the higher m the more likely it is that the manager will innovate.
However, now, a higher imitation probability π will reduce the marginal eﬀect of
m on the manager’s net gain from innovating, namely [ B−K−B(1−π)(1−m)].
Thus, unlike in Proposition 1, more competition on the product market will reduce
the eﬀect of institutional investment on managerial innovation.
255. Testing the predictions of the model
5.1. Institutional ownership and product market competition
So far we have documented a positive eﬀect of institutional ownership on inno-
vation. Both the career concern model and the lazy manager story deliver the
prediction that institutional ownership encourages managers to innovate. Where
the two approaches diﬀer is in the interaction between institutional ownership
and product market competition. In the career concern model the two are com-
plements (i.e. the positive eﬀect of institutions on innovations should be stronger
when competition is higher). By contrast, in the lazy manager story competition
and institutions are substitutes(see Neil Dryden, Stephen Nickell and Daphne
Nicolitsas, 1997). Indeed, in highly competitive environments there should be lit-
tle managerial slack and therefore little need for greater monitoring by institutions
or other mechanisms (e.g. Schmidt, 1997; Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007).
Table 4 analyzes what the interaction between institutional ownership and
product market competition is empirically. As a measure of product market com-
petition we use 1 - the Lerner Index in the ﬁrm’s three digit industry). The
ﬁrst column reproduces our baseline ﬁxed eﬀects Poisson model of citations (col-
umn (5) of Table 2), including also our measure of product market competition.
Competition has a positive association with innovation, although the eﬀect is not
signiﬁcant, while institutional ownership remains positive and signiﬁcant.19
Column (2) introduces an interaction term between ownership and competition
which is positive and signiﬁcant, consistent with competition and institutional
owners being complements. We then split the sample into observations with high
19As with Aghion et al (2005) there is some (weak) evidence of an inverted U relationship
between innovation and competition. If we include a term in the square of the (inverse) Lerner
Index it is negative, whereas the linear term remains positive. This quadratic term is insigniﬁ-
cant, however with a coeﬃcient of -6.852 and a standard error of 24.554.
26and low competition based on the median of the Lerner Index. In column (3) where
competition is high, the coeﬃcient on institutional ownership is large, positive
and signiﬁcant whereas in column (4) where competition is low the coeﬃcient in
institutional ownership is small and insigniﬁcant (0.009 vs. 0.002).
We illustrate these ﬁndings by plotting the implied value of patent citations at
diﬀerent levels of institutional ownership in Figure 5. This shows that it is only
in the high competition regime that there is an important eﬀect of institutions on
innovation.
A concern might be that we have allowed the Lerner Index to change over
time, so instead we consider a time invariant measure, averaging the Lerner over
our sample period. We repeat the speciﬁcations using this alternative measure
in the ﬁnal four columns with very similar results. For example, the interaction
term between competition and institutional ownership in column (6) remained
positive and signiﬁcant (coeﬃcient of 0.087 with a standard error of 0.033). We
also estimated the Lerner correcting for capital intensity as in Aghion et al (2005)
and Nickell (1996). Again, the interaction term remained positive and signiﬁcant
(coeﬃcient of 0.104 with a standard error of 0.043).
At face value, Table 4 seems inconsistent with the “lazy manager” interpre-
tation of the empirical ﬁndings and consistent with the simple career concerns
model outlined in the previous section.
5.2. CEO entrenchment and institutional ownership
A further implication of the “lazy manager” hypothesis is that the beneﬁts of
institutional ownership should be felt most sharply where agency costs are higher
and managers are more “entrenched”. Apart from competition there are several
settings where we might think agency costs are less likely to allow managers to
slack. First, where the market for corporate control is strong (e.g. via a credible
27threat of a hostile takeover), this should also discipline CEOs. Second, if share-
holders have more power this should mean that the ﬁrm is more “democratic”
and the power of the CEO less entrenched. As before, under the lazy manager hy-
pothesis institutional ownership should have more of an eﬀect when managers are
entrenched, while under the career concern hypothesis the impact of institutional
ownership on innovation should be weaker when managers are entrenched.
To measure the degree of entrenchment of CEOs it has become standard to
use the index introduced by Paul Gompers et al (2003), which is built upon the
number of antitakeovers provision in place (including relevant state antitakeover
statues). The shortcomings of this measure is that most of these devises were
introduced in the late 1980s, when hostile takeovers were rampant, and become
eﬀectively useless with the demise of hostile takeovers. Nevertheless, that boards
were willing to approve these statues provide an indication of the degree of control
o ft h eC E Oo v e rt h eb o a r d .
Table 5 investigates the interaction between managerial entrenchment and in-
stitutional ownership. As a measure of entrenchment, the ﬁrst four columns use
the index for state takeover laws and the last four columns the Gompers Index of
CEO power. The ﬁr s tc o l u m nl o o k sa tt h el i n e a re ﬀects of institutional ownership
and state laws protecting ﬁrms from takeovers. The coeﬃcient on institutional
o w n e r s h i pi sp o s i t i v ew h e r e a st h a to nt h ee n t r e n c h m e n tv a r i a b l ei sn e g a t i v e( b u t
insigniﬁcant). Column (2) includes an interaction which has a positive and sig-
niﬁcant coeﬃcient. This is the opposite of the lazy manager story: institutional
ownership is more eﬀective when managers are less entrenched. Column (3) esti-
mates the model on the sub-sample when the legal index is below the median level
of entrenchment, while column (4) uses the sub-sample when managers are more
entrenched. Consistently with column (3), the coeﬃcient on institutional owner-
ship is large and signiﬁcant in the sub-sample where managers are not entrenched
28w h e r e a si ti ss m a l la n di n s i g n i ﬁcant when state laws protect managers.
Column (5) of Table 5 shows that ownership is still positively correlated with
innovation even when we condition on the Gompers Index. The Gompers Index is
negatively and weakly signiﬁcantly associated with innovation. In column (6) the
interaction between institutional ownership and the Gompers Index is negative
and signiﬁcant in column (2). This suggests that institutions are more important
when managers are less entrenched (at least as measured by the Gompers’ index
of CEO power). When we split the sample by the median value of the Gompers
Index, institutional ownership looks equally important in both sub-samples. So
there is certainly no evidence of substitution between institutional ownership and
entrenchment
So again, the evidence from Table 5 (like that of Table 4) appears to be incon-
sistent with the lazy manager interpretation of the positive eﬀect of institutional
ownership on innovation, and more in line with the career concern one.
5.3. Institutional ownership and managerial turnover
A third prediction of the career concern model is that managerial turnover should
be less sensitive to performance in the presence of institutional investors. By
contrast, under the lazy manager story institutional ownership should not reduce
the impact of bad realization of proﬁts on the probability of managerial turnover.
If anything it should increase that impact because it makes it easy to resolve the
collective action problem in ﬁring the manager.
Table 6 presents evidence on the interaction between proﬁtability and institu-
tional ownership on forced managerial turnover. We use the data from Fisman et
al (2005)20 which has information on CEO ﬁrings and other dismissal constructed
from detailed readings of contemporary accounts in the ﬁnancial press such as the
20We would like to thank Ray Fisman for kindly supplying the data to us.
29Wall Street Journal. Since this covered only the larger S&P500 ﬁrms until 1995,
we only have a sub-sample of our main dataset (249 ﬁrms)21. The dependent
variable in Table 6 is whether a CEO was ﬁred. We estimate this speciﬁcation by
probit Maximum Likelihood. We start by replicating Fisman et al (2005). In par-
ticular, in the ﬁr s tc o l u m nw er e g r e s sw h e t h e rt h eC E Ow a sﬁr e dt h a ty e a ro nt h e
lagged change in proﬁtability (proﬁts normalized by assets). Like them, we ﬁnd
that higher proﬁtability growth is associated with a (weakly) signiﬁcantly lower
probability the CEO will be ﬁred. Column (2), then, interacts the proﬁtability
variable with the proportion of equity owned by institutions. The coeﬃcient on
this interaction is positive and signiﬁcant and indicates that ﬁrms with greater
institutional ownership are signiﬁcantly less likely to ﬁre their CEOs when there
is “bad news”. This is in line with the Career concern model presented above
and inconsistent with the lazy manager story. Since Figure 2 suggested that in-
stitutional ownership mattered when more than 25% of the stock was owned by
institutions, instead of the continuous variable in column (3) as interaction term
we use an indicator variable equal to one if institutional owners controlled more
than a quarter of shares. The results are very similar.
Column (4) presents a robustness test obtained by restricting the sample to
the post 1991 period. If anything the results are stronger. Since CEOs leave
their job also voluntarily, as a control we can test whether institutional owner-
ship aﬀects also these voluntary departures. To do so, we change the dependent
variable in column (5) to be only voluntary departures (i.e. all exits except ﬁr-
ings). Consistent with our interpretation the coeﬃcient on the interaction term
is insigniﬁcant (and has actually reversed signs). So despite the smaller sample
21Given this much smaller sample size we use ownership in the ﬁrst year of our sample (1991).
This enables us to use more of the CEO ﬁring data. We assume ownership does not change
much for four years prior to 1991 and after 1991 and estimate on 1988-1995 in column (1) of
Table 6. We show our results are robust to using a shorter time window in column (4).
30size, Table 6 is broadly consistent with our careers concern model suggesting that
institutional ownership partially insulates CEOs from short-term pressures (in so
doing encouraging them to invest in risky innovation).
5.4. Disaggregating the type of Institutional Ownership
We can gather additional insights on the mechanism through which institutional
ownership aﬀects innovation by diﬀerentiating among institutions on the basis of
their style of investing. Bushee (1998) classiﬁes institutional investors in three
groups: "quasi-indexed" (institutions that are widely diversiﬁed and do not trade
much), "dedicated" (institutions whose holdings are more concentrated, but do
not trade much), and "transient" (institutions whose holdings are diversiﬁed but
trade often in and out from individual stocks.
We follow this classiﬁcation.22 In our sample quasi-indexers own 25% of ﬁrm
equity, dedicated owned 10% and transients own 8%.
Table 7 presents the results from using this information. Column (1) presents
the baseline results on the sub-sample where we were able to obtain this classi-
ﬁcation. It shows that the results remain quite stable: there is still a positive
and signiﬁcant association between institutional owners and innovation. In col-
umn (2) we divide the institutional ownership variable into the three groups. The
coeﬃcients on the dedicated and transient institutions are positive, signiﬁcant
and similar to each other (we cannot reject that they take the same coeﬃcient,
p-value =0.671). By contrast, the coeﬃcient on the quasi-indexed institutions is
close to zero and insigniﬁcant. In the ﬁnal column we illustrate this by including
the standard institutional ownership variable from column (1) and the proportion
of equity owned by quasi-indexed institutions. The coeﬃcient on quasi-indexed
22We are very grateful to Brian Bushee for providing us with this data. See Data Appendix
for how Bushee constructs these.
31institutions is negative and highly signiﬁc a n t ,i n d i c a t i n gt h a tt h e r ei saz e r oe f -
fect from increasing their share of equity; by contrast the marginal eﬀect of other
institutions is 0.014 and signiﬁcant.
The absence of any eﬀect of quasi-indexed funds is broadly consistent with the
model we present. The fact that dedicated institutions are not much better than
transient institutions is perhaps more surprising. One possible interpretation is
that for institutional investor to have an impact they need to have either signiﬁcant
voice (as dedicated institution) or a strong exit option (as transient ones). Quasi-
indexed seem to have neither.
6. Conclusions
G i v e nt h ei m p o r t a n c ei n n o v a t i o nh a so ng r o w t ha n dt h ew e a l t ho fn a t i o n s ,i ti s
paramount to understand the incentives to innovate at the ﬁrm level. This paper
tries to do so by studying the relationship between innovation and institutional
ownership.
Contrary to the view that institutional ownership creates a short-term focus in
managers, we ﬁnd that their presence boosts innovation, even after accounting for
an increase in R&D and the endogeneity of institutional ownership. This positive
impact could derive from the disciplinary eﬀect of institutions on lazy managers
or from the reassurance they provide to managers concerned about their career.
Thanks to a simple model that nests these two hypotheses, we are able to derive
three implications able to distinguish between them. In all three cases, the data
seems to support the career concern model and reject the lazy manager one.
If conﬁrmed these results suggest that risk considerations at the managerial
level play an important role in preventing innovation. Given the positive exter-
nality innovation entails, it might be useful to think about public policies able to
reduce the innovation risk for managers of publicly traded companies.
32This paper has also interesting implications for corporate governance in gen-
eral. If career concerns, not the desire to live a quiet life or to build an empire
are the main source of managerial agency problems, then many of the public pol-
icy prescription changes. For example, boards composed mostly of outsiders can
jeopardize the ability of the board to separate luck from skill in the CEO perfor-
mance, increasing her risk aversion and jeopardizing innovation (see also Adams
and Ferreira, 2005).
There are many directions this research could and should be taken. One po-
tentially important omission is that we have abstracted away from the impact
institutional owners may have on the design of incentive contracts to overcome
the disincentives to innovate (and how this interacts with competition). This
would be a fruitful line of future research currently pursued by Gustavo Manso
(2008) and Richard Holden (2008).
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37Data Appendix
A. Main Dataset
We combine several ﬁrm level panel datasets. Because we are using patents
(weighted by total future citations) as our key measure of innovation, we rely on
the matching of the US Patents and Trademark Dataset (USPTO) with Compus-
tat lodged at the NBER (see Bronwyn Hall et al, 2001, and Jaﬀea n dT r a j t e n b e r g ,
2002, for details). The matching was performed based on the ownership structure
in 1989, so our sample is of a cohort of ﬁrms who were publicly listed in 1989 or
entered subsequently. We follow these ﬁrms through the 1990s (including those
who subsequently died). We use the updated version of the NBER match contain-
ing patent citations through to 2002 (downloaded from Bronwyn Hall’s website).
All patents granted between 1963 and 1999 are included (just under 3 million
patents) and citation information is available from 1975 to 2002 (over 16 million
citations). The need to have some patent data is the main reason why our sample
is much smaller than the full Compustat sample.
The second dataset we draw on is the text ﬁles from Compact Disclosure.
This is an electronic version of the 13-F forms that all institutional organiza-
tions are obliged to lodge at the SEC on a quarterly basis if they have at least
$100m in equity assets under discretionary management. The data includes the
numbers of institutional owners, the number of share issues and the percentage
of outstanding shares held by each institution (our key measure of institutional
ownership). This dataset is not wholly consistent before 1990, so we use own-
ership data from 1991 onwards. The ownership data covers almost all the ﬁrms
in the Computsat-USPTO match (we lose only three observations due to own-
ership changes in 1990), so the merging of the two datasets is straightforward.
Compact Disclosure identiﬁes ﬁve types of institutional owners: banks, insurance
companies, investment companies, independent investment advisors and “other”
which includes internally managed pension funds, colleges and universities, foun-
dations and other miscellaneous institutions and endowments (law ﬁrms, private
investment partnerships, etc.).
The merged dataset consists of 1,078 ﬁrms and 7,923 observations between
1991 (the ﬁrst year of the ownership data) and 1999 (the last year of the patent
data). We are able to use lags of patent information back to 1969, however, so
our patent stock variables include all this past information. Since our preferred
regressions use ﬁxed eﬀects we condition our sample on ﬁrms who received at least
citations and had at least two years of non-missing data on all variables between
381991 and 1999 over this period. This leaves us with 6,208 observations on 803
ﬁr m sw h i c hi so u rb a s e l i n es a m p l e .
Descriptive statistics are in Table 1.
B. Other datasets for robustness tests
In the robustness tests we also use other ﬁrm-level datasets. These datasets cover
sub-samples of the ﬁrms in our database, so this is the reason why the number of
observations in smaller in these regressions.
B.1. Entrenchment of managers
For information on governance we use the Investor Responsibility Research Center
(IRRC) which publishes detailed listings of corporate governance provisions for
individual ﬁrms in Corporate Takeover Defenses. The data on state takeover
legislation is from Pinnell (2000). Paul Gompers et al (2003) construct an index
of CEO power (relative to shareholders) as the sum of up to 24 unique provisions
to do with how incumbent mangers can be protected. We split out the state law
sub-index of Gompers Index which is the simple average of the existence of six
diﬀerent laws.
B.2. CEO Firings Data
This data is from Fisman, Khurana and Rhodes-Kropf (2005). They followed a
sample of largest ﬁrms in 1980 (the publicly traded Fortune 500 companies plus
the 100 largest commercial banks, 100 largest ﬁnancial services ﬁrms, 100 largest
retail ﬁrms and 50 largest transportation ﬁrms) until 1995. The key variable they
construct is whether the CEO was forcibly removed from his job, as opposed to
another form of exit (e.g. if retired or ill). They do this by examining all CEO
departures prior to the age of 61. They then use reports from the Wall Street
Journal and New York Times to distinguish the type of exit. For information
on managerial characteristics (such as CEO tenure) we use the S&P ExecuComp
database. We are grateful to Ray Fisman for supplying us with this data. We
measure proﬁtability following Fisman et al (2005) by the ratio of operating proﬁts
divided by the sum of current assets and property, plant and equipment, and like
them we trim the change of proﬁtability for outliers. Tenure is the number of
years a CEO has held this position.
39B.3. Disaggregation by type of Institutional Owner
It is possible to distinguish the name of the institutional owner from Compact
Disclosure. Following Bushey (1998, 2001) we divide all institutions into three
types: quasi-indexers, transient and dedicated. Bushey determined which ﬁrms
fall into which category by using a factor analysis method where a larger group
of institutional ownership characteristics are reduced to three: BLOCK (whether
the institution tends to have large blockholdings or is very diversiﬁed), PTURN
(whether the portfolio held is stable or turns over rapidly) and MOMENTUM
(whether the institution reduces shareholding quickly in response to "bad news").
Using these three factors he creates three clusters of institutional ownership types.
"Quasi-indexers" have low values of all three factors: they are diversiﬁed, have
low turnover and are relatively insensitive to bad news. "Dedicated" investors
have high blockholdings in single ﬁrms, low portfolio turnover and are insensitive
to "bad news". The ﬁnal group of "transients" have low blockholdings in any one
ﬁrm, high turnover and high momentum. Brian Bushey kindly supplied us with
the data breaking institutional owners into these three classes for more recent
data that we could match in to our sample.
Using this categorization we can calculate for each year, what proportion of a
ﬁrm’s shares are held by each of these institutional investors. To ensure that the
data is consistent with use only observations where our measure of institutional
ownership and Bushey’s where within 5% of each other (the correlation is over
0.99).
40Figure 1: Proportion of US stock market held by institutional owners, 1950-2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Board Flow of Funds Report (various years) 
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Figure 2: 
Nonparametric Regression of count of a firm’s patents and the proportion of a firm’s voting equity owned by Institutions 
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NOTES: This Figure presents the non-parametric (local linear) regression of the firm patent counts and the proportion of equity owned 
by institutions (the graph is from 1995 in the middle of our sample period) 
  43Figure 3:  
Nonparametric Regression of CITES (ln(Patent Citations)) and the proportion of a firm’s voting equity owned by Institutions 
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NOTES: This Figure presents the non-parametric (local linear) regression of firm patents weighted by future citations and the 
proportion of equity owned by institutions (the graph is from 1995 in the middle of our sample period) 
 
  44Figure 4: Change in the cumulative proportion of institutional ownership before and after a firm is added to the S&P500 (7 
year window) 
 
 
NOTES: The graph shows the cumulated mean change in the proportion of equity owned by institutions up to three years before and 
three years after a firm becomes a member of the S&P 500 Index (years -1 to 0 is the year the firm was added). For example, in the 
year a firm joined the S&P 500 8.1 percentage points more of its stock became owned by institutions. The following year institutional 
owners increased this proportion by 4.2 percentage points, and so on. 
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Figure 5: Change in the cumulative innovation before and after a firm becomes added to the S&P500 (7 year window) 
 
 
NOTES: The graph shows the cumulated mean change in the number of patents up to three years before and three years after a firm 
becomes a member of the S&P 500 Index (years -1 to 0 contains the point at which the firm was added). 
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Figure 6: Change in the cumulative innovation before and after a firm becomes added to the S&P500 (7 year window) 
 
 
 
NOTES: The graph shows the cumulated mean change in the number of cite-weighted patents up to three years before and three years 
after a firm becomes a member of the S&P 500 Index (years -1 to 0 contains the point at which the firm was added). The cites emasure 
is normalized on the yearly average. 
  47 Figure 7:  
Predicted relationship between the increase in the number of cites and the proportion of equity owned by institutions 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTES: This Figure presents the predicted number of cites as a function of the proportion of equity owned by institutions for firms in 
high competition industries (upper line) and lower competition (lower line). The estimates are taken from the Poisson model of 
columns (3) and (4) of Table 4. 
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TABLE 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
VARIABLE Mean  Standard 
deviation  Median  Min  Max  Source  Observations 
(Future) Cite-weighted 
patent counts  176 923  7  0 23,121  USPTO  6,208 
Patents  24 105  2  0 2,405  USPTO  6,208 
% Institutional 
Ownership  45.5 23.1 48.2  0 100  SEC  6,208 
Employment (1000s)  16.0 45.4  3.7 0.05  756.3  Compustat 6,208 
Sales ($m)  3,475 10,750  608  0.019  174,694  Compustat  6,208 
R&D ($m)  126 528 9.0  0  8900  Compustat 6,208 
1-Lerner Index  0.861 0.044 0.871 0.488 0.974  Compustat  6,208 
Index of State Laws 
blocking hostile 
takeovers  
31.0 22.9 16.7  0  100 
IRRC and 
Gompers et al 
(2003) 
1,139 
CEO Power Index  9.7 2.9 10  2  18 
IRRC and 
Gompers et al 
(2003) 
1,357 
CEO Firing  0.04 0.20  0  0  1  Fisman et al 
(2005) 
1,897 
CEO exit (not firing)  0.09 0.018  0  0  1  Fisman et al 
(2005) 
1,897 
CEO Tenure  7.6 6.7  6  0  47  Fisman et al 
(2005) 
1,897 
Profits/Assets  0.093 0.052 0.087  -0.064 0.577  Compustat  1,897 
 
NOTES:  Data is taken from the sample of 6,208 observations (803 firms) used for the regression of citations/patents sample unless otherwise stated. 
  49  50
TABLE 2: INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP AND INNOVATION (CITE-WEIGHTED PATENTS) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8) 
Estimation Method  OLS  OLS  Poisson  Poisson  Poisson  Negative 
Binomial 
Negative 
Binomial 
Negative 
Binomial 
Dependent variable 
 
Ln (CITES)  
 
Ln (CITES)  
 
 CITES  
 
CITES  
 
 CITES  
 
CITES  
 
CITES  
 
 CITES  
 
Share of Equity 
owned by 
institutions   
0.006*** 
(0.002) 
0.005** 
(0.002) 
0.010*** 
(0.002) 
0.008*** 
(0.002) 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
0.009*** 
(0.002) 
0.008*** 
(0.002) 
0.006*** 
(0.002) 
ln (R&D Stock) 
   
0.337*** 
(0.040) 
 
0.493*** 
(0.140) 
0.009 
(0.107) 
 
0.448*** 
(0.039) 
0.178*** 
(0.029) 
Ln(K/L) 
0.433*** 
(0.094) 
0.261*** 
(0.085) 
0.483*** 
(0.136) 
0.346** 
(0.165) 
0.440*** 
(0.132) 
0.613*** 
(0.106) 
0.343*** 
(0.087) 
0.264*** 
(0.076) 
Ln(Sales) 
0.568*** 
(0.037) 
0.310*** 
(0.045) 
0.920*** 
(0.041) 
0.349*** 
(0.117) 
0.184** 
(0.063) 
0.493*** 
(0.047) 
0.229*** 
(0.058) 
0.127*** 
(0.038) 
Fixed Effects 
controls   No No No No Yes    No No Yes   
Observations  4,025 4,025 6,028 6,208  6,208 6,208  6,208 6,208 
Firms  803 803 803 803 803 803 803  803 
 
NOTES:  ***=significant at the 1% level, **=significant at the 5% level, *=significant at the 10% level. CITES is a count of a firm’s patents weighted by the number of future 
citations. Coefficients are from count data models with standard errors clustered by firm (in parentheses). All regressions control for ln(sales), ln(capital/sales) ratio), and a full set 
of four digit industry dummies and time dummies. Estimation period 1991-1999 (citations up to 2002); Fixed effects controls using the Blundell, Griffith and Van Reenen (1999) 
mean scaling estimator.  
TABLE 3: INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP AND INNOVATION - CONTROLLING FOR ENDOGENEITY OF 
OWNERSHIP 
 
 
Dependent variable: CITES  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Estimation Method  Poisson 
OLS 
(First Stage) 
Poisson and 
control function  Poisson 
OLS 
(First Stage) 
Poisson and 
control function 
Dependent variable 
CITES 
citation 
weighted 
patent counts 
Share of Equity 
owned by 
institutions 
CITES 
citation weighted 
patent counts 
CITES 
citation weighted 
patent counts 
Share of Equity 
owned by 
institutions 
CITES 
citation weighted 
patent counts 
         
Share of Equity owned by 
institutions   
0.010*** 
(0.002) 
 
0.043*** 
(0.012) 
0.007** 
(0.002) 
 
0.029** 
(0.013) 
S&P500   
9.238*** 
(0.788) 
  
8.872*** 
(0.805) 
 
         
Exogeneity test (p-value)     0.007    0.087 
FE controls  No  No No Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  6,208  6,208 6,208  6,208 6,208  6,208 
Firms  803 803  803  803  803  803 
 
NOTES:  ***=significant at the 1% level, **=significant at the 5% level, *=significant at the 10% level. Columns (1)-(6) control for ln(sales), ln(capital/employment), 4-digit 
industry dummies and time dummies. Estimation period is 1991 -1999. S&P500 is a dummy variable equal to unity if the firm is a member of the S&P 500 Index.  FE controls use 
the Blundell et al (1999) method in columns (4)-(6) and within groups in (7)-(9).  Exogeneity test is a Hausman test. 
 
  51TABLE 4: ALLOWING THE INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP EFFECT TO VARY WITH PRODUCT MARKET 
COMPETITION  
 
Dependent variable: 
CITES 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Competition Measure  Lerner varies 
over time 
Lerner varies 
over time 
Lerner varies 
over time 
Lerner varies 
over time 
Lerner 
constant over 
time 
Lerner 
constant over 
time 
Lerner 
constant over 
time 
Lerner 
constant over 
time 
Sample  Pooled  Pooled 
High  Product 
Market 
Competition  
(1-Lerner) > 
0.871) 
Low Product 
Market 
Competition  
(1-Lerner) < 
0.871) 
Pooled  Pooled 
High  Product 
Market 
Competition  
(1-Lerner) > 
0.871) 
Low Product 
Market 
Competition  
(1-Lerner) < 
0.871) 
            
(Share of Equity owned by  
institutions) * 
Competition 
 
0.082** 
(0.035) 
  
 
0.087** 
(0.033) 
  
Share of Equity owned by 
institutions   
0.007** 
(0.002) 
-0.064** 
(0.030) 
0.009** 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
0.007*** 
(0.003) 
-0.068*** 
(0.028) 
0.009*** 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
Competition 
0.343 
(2.329) 
-3.694 
(3.330) 
4.664 
(3.943)    
1.376    
(4.939)    
    
Observations  6,208  6,208  3,085 3,123 6,208  6,208  3,085 3,123 
Firms  803 803 542 637 803 803 542 637 
 
NOTES: ***=significant  at the 1% level, **=significant at the 5% level, *=significant at the 10% level. The dependent variable is future cite-weighted patents. Each column is a 
separate Poisson regression as in Table 2 column (5): all regressions control for year dummies, ln(sales), ln(capital/labor), ln(R&D stock), four digit industry dummies (in columns 
(1)-(4) and three digit in columns (5)-(8)) and fixed effects using Blundell et al (1999) method. Standard errors are clustered at the three digit industry level. Product market 
competition constructed as (1 - Lerner Index) where Lerner is calculated as the median gross margin from the entire Compustat database in the firm’s three digit industry.  
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TABLE 5:  
ALLOWING THE INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP EFFECT TO VARY WITH  MANAGERIAL “ENTRENCHMENT”  
 
Dependent variable: 
CITES 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Measure of Entrenchment  State Laws against hostile takeovers  Gompers Index of managerial power over shareholders 
Sample  Pooled  Pooled 
Low 
Entrenchment: 
Few Laws block 
takeovers 
(Index less than 
or equal to 16.7) 
High 
Entrenchment: 
Many State 
Laws block 
takeovers 
(Index greater 
than 16.7) 
Pooled  Pooled 
Low 
Entrenchment 
(Gompers’ 
Index greater 
less than 10) 
High 
entrenchment 
(Gompers Index 
greater than or 
equal to 10) 
(Share of Equity owned by 
institutions) * 
(State Laws blocking 
hostile takeovers) 
 
-0.039** 
(0.016) 
  
 
   
(Share of Equity owned by 
institutions) * 
(Gompers’ Index)  
 
   
 
-0.003** 
(0.001) 
  
Share of Equity owned by 
institutions   
0.007*** 
(0.003) 
0.017*** 
(0.005) 
0.010*** 
(0.003) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
0.008*** 
(0.003) 
0.032*** 
(0.010) 
0.009*** 
(0.003) 
0.008** 
(0.004) 
State Laws blocking 
hostile takeovers 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
0.021*** 
(0.008) 
-0.022** 
(0.011) 
0.0002 
(0.0075) 
    
Gompers’ Index       -0.050* 
(0.026) 
0.105* 
(0.061) 
0.013 
(0.043) 
-0.105 
(0.066) 
Observations  1,139  1,139 675  464 1,357  1,357 613  744 
Firms  406 406 243 165 539 539 277 309 
 
NOTES: ***=significant  at the 1% level, **=significant at the 5% level, *=significant at the 10% level. The dependent variable is future cite-weighted patent regressions. Each 
column is a separate Poisson regression as in Table 2 column (5): all regressions control for year dummies, ln(sales), ln(capital/labor), ln(R&D stock), industry dummies (three 
digit) and fixed effects using Blundell et al (1999) method. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level. State Takeover law index is an average of 6 different state laws that make 
it harder to launch a hostile takeover bid. Gompers Index is an average of up to 26 provisions in the firm’s charter. The entrenchment measures are based on  data from IRRC in 
1993, 1995 and 1998.  
 TABLE 6: THE IMPACT OF POOR PERFORMANCE ON CEO FIRING PROBABILITY IS LOWER WITH MORE 
INSTITUTIONAL OWNERS 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Dependent variable  CEO Fired  CEO Fired  CEO Fired  CEO Fired  Unforced CEO exit 
        
Δ(Profits/Assets)t-1  -0.479* 
(0.251) 
-1.604*** 
(0.496) 
-1.274*** 
(0.362) 
-1.668** 
(0.690) 
0.715 
(1.224) 
(Share of Equity owned by 
institutions)*Δ(Profits/Assets)t-1
    
0.025** 
(0.010) 
   
Share of Equity owned by institutions
 a   
-0.037 
(0.023) 
    
(Share of Equity owned by institutions>25%) 
*Δ(Profits/Assets)t-1   
 1.057** 
(0.456) 
1.364* 
(0.790) 
-0.513 
(1.294) 
Share of Equity owned by institutions>25%   
 -0.033** 
(0.021) 
-0.039 
(0.029) 
0.033 
(0.022) 
         
Observations  1,897 1,897 1,897 1,178 1,178 
Firms  249 249 249 249 249 
Years  1988-1995 1988-1995 1988-1995 1991-1995 1991-1995 
 
a Coefficient and standard error multiplied by 100 
 
NOTES: ***=significant  at the 1% level, **=significant at the 5% level, *=significant at the 10% level. The dependent variable is 1 if CEO was fired and zero otherwise. CEO 
firings are from Fisman et al (2005). All regressions include a full set of time dummies and a quadratic in the tenure (in post) of the CEO. Estimation is by probit ML, marginal 
effects are shown above standard errors (in parentheses) that are clustered by firm. Share of equity owned by institutions is based in 1991 (first year we have ownership data). 
“Unforced CEO exists” are when the CEO leaves but is not fired (e.g. for reasons of retirement or death). See text and Data Appendix for full description.  
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TABLE 7: DISAGGREGATING INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP  
 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Share of Equity Owned by institutions  0.006** 
(0.002)   
0.014*** 
(0.004) 
Share of Equity Owned by quasi-indexed 
institutions   
0.001 
(0.004) 
-0.014* 
(0.007) 
Share of Equity Owned by “dedicated” 
institutions   
0.012** 
(0.006) 
 
Share of Equity Owned by “transient” 
institutions   
0.016** 
(0.007) 
 
      
Observations  3,157 3,157 3,157 
Firms  678 678 678 
Years  1991-1998 1991-1998 1991-1998 
 
NOTES: *** = significant  at the 1% level, **=significant at the 5% level, *=significant at the 10% level. The 
dependent variable is the number of patents weighted by future citations. Poisson models with controls for fixed effects 
(Blundell et al, 1999), ln(sales), ln(capital/labor ratio), ln(R&D stock) and full set of time dummies and four digit 
industry dummies. Standard errors clustered by firm. All specifications identical to Table 2 column (5) except we also 
control for ln(employment). The definitions of different institutional ownership types follows Bushee (1998) – see Data 
Appendix for details.  
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TABLE A1: R&D AND INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP 
 
 (1)  (3)  (4) 
Estimation Method  OLS  OLS OLS 
Dependent variable 
Ln (R&D 
Expenditure) 
 
Ln (R&D 
Expenditure) 
 
Ln (R&D 
Expenditure) 
 
      
Share of Equity owned 
by institutions   
0.038** 
(0.003) 
0.006*** 
(0.001) 
 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
       
controls   
Ln(capital-labor ratio), 4 
digit industry dummies 
Ln(capital-labor ratio), 
fixed effects 
       
Observations  4,922 4,922 4,922 
Firms  653 653 653 
 
NOTES: ***=significant  at the 1% level, **=significant at the 5% level, *=significant at the 10% level. 
 Columns control for ln(sales) and time dummies. All standard errors clustered by firm. Estimation period 1992-1999. 
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TABLE A2: PRODUCTIVITY AND INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP 
 
 (1)  (2) 
(3)  
(4) 
Estimation Method  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS 
Dependent variable  Ln(Sales)  Ln(Sales)  Ln(Sales)  Ln(Sales) 
        
Share of Equity owned by 
institutions
a   
0.035*** 
(0.007) 
0.031*** 
(0.006) 
0.031*** 
(0.006) 
0.008** 
(0.004) 
R&D stock 
- - 
0.028** 
(0.011) 
0.040* 
(0.023) 
Labor  1.026*** 
(0.014) 
0.636*** 
(0.042) 
0.636*** 
(0.042) 
0.504*** 
(0.045) 
Capital 
 
0.350*** 
(0.038) 
0.350*** 
(0.038) 
0.326*** 
(0.039) 
Fixed Effect 
No No  No  Yes (Within 
Groups) 
        
Observations  6,208 6,208  6,208  6,208 
Firms  803 803  803  803 
 
a Coefficient and standard error multiplied by 10 
 
NOTES:  ***=significant  at the 1% level, **=significant at the 5% level, *=significant at the 10% level.  
Coefficients estimated by OLS with , standard errors clustered by firm (in parentheses).Controls for ln(capital), 
ln(employment), four digit industry dummies and time dummies. Estimation period is 1991-1999.  
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TABLE A3: OWNERSHIP AND INNOVATION INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE  
REGRESSIONS; ALTERNATIVE TRANSFORMATION OF DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Estimation Method  OLS 
OLS 
(First Stage) 
IV 
Dependent variable 
Ln (1+CITES) 
citation weighted 
patent counts 
Share of Equity 
owned by institutions 
Ln (1+CITES) 
citation weighted 
patent counts 
      
Share of Equity owned by 
institutions  
0.007** 
(0.002) 
 
0.122** 
(0.035) 
S&P500   
7.8254*** 
(0.724) 
 
      
Observations  6,208 6,208 6,208 
Firms  803 803 803 
 
NOTES:  ***=significant  at the 1% level, **=significant at the 5% level, *=significant at the 10% level.  
Columns control for ln(sales), ln(capital/employment), ln(R&D stock/employment), 4-digit industry dummies and time 
dummies. All standard errors clustered by firm. Estimation period 1992-1999. S&P500 is a dummy variable equal to 
unity if the firm is a member of the S&P 500 Index.  
 
 